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MUNICIPAL HOUSING IN SCOTLAND: THE LONG GOODBYE? 
Duncan Maclennan 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than 100 years municipal governments in Britain, and 
especially Scotland, have been regarded as the key public organizations 
implementing housing policies. At the end of the last century it was 
municipal action, to cope with the public health externalities of slum 
housing, which prompted central government policies. At that time with 
rudimentary systems of data recording and retrieval and high real 
communication costs it made good sense for municipalities to be, at the 
very least, the agents of central government. Also, central government 
then hoped that municipal housing would be subsidized from local rates 
rather than central taxes. 
After 1919 and the introduction of subsidies for council housing, 
municipalities became key providers of social housing for low and middle 
income groups as well as acquiring powers to control and intervene in more 
general market provision. This expanded even faster after 1945 with 
welfare state policies. Nowhere, in Britain or Western Europe, has the 
association of housing policy and municipal provision been so extensive and 
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The proportion of Scottish homes rented from municipalities, New 
Towns and Scottish Special Housing Association (SSHA), has fallen from a 
peak of 56 percent in the 1970s to just under 50 percent at the end of 1986. 
Even now some 22 of the 56 district councils have more than half of their 
stock in municipal housing. It is not just large cities such as Glasgow, 
Dundee and Aberdeen (63, 57 and 48 percent respectively) which have 
large municipal sectors. The smaller districts, at the edge of metropolitan 
areas which had early industrial growth often now have very large public 
housing sectors. For instance Monklands and Motherwell with 81 percent 
and 79 council units, respectively, are extreme but not untypical. 
The municipal sector is readily identifiable in any Scottish town or 
village from Aberdeen to Ardrishaig, not just because public and private 
sectors have been spatially separate in their development but because of the 
often distinctive styles and materials used in the council sector. In Glasgow, 
the largest municipal housing authority in Western Europe, some 75 
percent of political wards have 50 percent municipal housing and indeed 50 
percent of wards have more than 75 percent municipal units. The 
architecture, geography and visual environment of much of Scotland's 
cities and small towns is dominated by this municipal movement. And 
moving beyond the physical, the scale of council housing has permeated 
economic, social and political relationships in Scotland. These interactions 
were so strong and pervasive that criticism of social housing was seen as a 
wider attack on particular social and economic policy approaches. 
However these correlations of beliefs, objectives and means of policy no 
longer hold true, if they ever did. Fifty years of intensive housing policy 
leads us to the current context where there are now doubts that the state will 
provide more acceptable housing for low and middle income groups than 
will the market (appropriately assisted). And even if we are to have a social 
housing sector it is no longer obvious that its governance should be by 
municipalities. Recent and soon-to-be-announced legislative proposals 
seek to curtail the municipal role in Scottish housing provision, both by 
promoting increased private provision and stimulating the rate of non-
municipal housing agencies. 
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This paper, after setting the context of recent developments in the role 
of municipalities in Scottish housing policy, Section II, considers a number 
of key issues related to the proposed shifts in policy. The possible reasons 
for municipal difficulty are considered in Section III and the case for 
curtailment probed. Section IV, recognizing that there exists a strong 
government preference for home ownership growth, considers the possible 
role of municipalities in a new rental sector for Scotland. Finally, in Section 
V, the likely influences of new legislation is discussed in relation to possible 
municipal roles. 
DE-EMPHASISING THE MUNICIPAL ROLE 
Reducing Roles to 1980 
In my view, there has been no clear strategy for British, and therefore 
Scottish, housing policy since the early 1970s. By clear strategy I mean a set 
of policy actions in which clear objectives are pursued efficiently by 
appropriate agencies or individuals. 
The municipal growth strategy of the period 1955-75 was, on its own 
terms, quite consistently developed. The key objective was to build shelter 
units for as many people as quickly as possible. Central government 
facilitated this process with specific grants. Pooled rents and costs distorted 
rent-quality relations but favoured increased output. Development issues 
forestalled the introduction of management systems and monitoring. 
Tenants views were not regarded as very important. Such procedures 
would not now all be regarded as desirable, but they were quite consistent 
with the objectives of the time. Those building the "welfare state" gave 
scant attention to how it was to be managed and maintained in the long run. 
The Housing Finance Act of 1972 whilst never threatening the role of 
municipalities, was a coherent attempt to relate income subsidies to 
household needs, and dwelling rents to dwelling characteristics. Since then, 
until now, we have had no coherent strategy. Labour wandered along from 
1974 to 1979 introducing ad hoc subsidy systems and commencing the 
housing spending cuts so forcefully implemented by its successors. 
The 1977 Green Paper on housing in Scotland did recognize, perhaps a 
decade too late, that a new pluralistic structure was required for Scottish 
housing. It was the first Labour document to advocate measures to sell 
council houses and to assist first time home buyers. Thus it recognized, at 
least implicitly, that municipalities would decrease in relative importance 
as providers of housing. On the other hand it suggested new roles. Assisting 
in the private market, cooperation with associations in rehabilitation and 
special needs provisions were tasks which gave credence to a burgeoning 
strategic planning and coordination role for housing departments. 
Municipal housing planning and enabling roles, it was accepted, would 
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offset any losses in municipal control or status implied by their reduced 
share of direct housing provision. 
Finance and De-municipalization Since 1979 
The first traces of the 1977 Green Paper were barely in place when the 
Conservative administration of 1979 was returned. Since 1979 there has 
been a sharp reduction in housing policy spending in Scotland, but until 
1985 it is also arguable that there was no clear, constructive housing 
strategy. 
From 1979 to the present, government has been committed to reducing 
the public sector borrowing requirement and government expenditure. In 
the period 1979 to 1984 there was a clear anti-housing expenditure stance in 
government policy which, as is indicated below, had a major effect on 
municipal housing. At the same time the key thrust in "housing policy" was 
tenure change, fuelled by transfer of council and SSHA dwellings to owner 
occupation. From April 1977 to June 1987 some 8.1 percent of Scottish 
municipal housing stock has been transferred in this way, often with the 
lowest sales in the authorities with the highest council shares and vice-
versa. Clearly this transfer has reduced the municipal role, though notably 
New Towns and SSHA had disposed of26.4 and 17.4percent oftheir stock 
in the same period. 
An analysis of current and capital expenditure on housing in Scotland 
does not sustain the continued cutting perspective of the popular press (See 
Tables 3 to 6). Analysis of real capital expenditure on social housing in 
Scotland indicates that overall expenditures fell from 1979/80 to 1985/86, 
with the exception of election years. As estimates for 1988-89 have also 
risen by 5 percent after the 1987-88 figure, there has, in fact, been a 
sustained real increase in social housing investment in Scotland since 1984/ 
85, with the Conservative government of 1987/88 spending more than the 
Labour administration of 1977178. 
Rising social sector investment need not mean increased municipal 
investment. The figures in Table 3 make it apparent that in the period of 
housing investment cutback, the municipalities were particularly curtailed, 
and their share of spending fell from 78 percent in 1978179 to 58 percent in 
1982/83. It is important to stress that this trend has been reversed in recent 
years. Each year since 1984/85 municipalities have been given an increasing 
share of a growing programme. 
These shifts do not represent a softening of the government's views on 
municipal competence. Rather it reflects a growing recognition, by central 
government, of the need to re-invest in and modernize social housing areas. 
Almost ninety percent of municipal housing investment is now devoted to 
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TABLE3 
Gross Public Sector Capital Spending on Housing in Scotland 
1977178 to 1987/88 (Real, 1987/88 prices) 
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Investment by Social Housing Sectors in Scotland 
1983-84 to 1987-88 
Distribution of Scottish 
Spending on Modernisation 
Percent spent by 
Year LAs&NTs SSHA HC 
1983/84 66 13 21 
1984/85 64 15 21 
1985/86 69 11 20 
1986/87 71 9 20 
1987/88 75 7 18 
Source: Public Expenditure to 1990: 91. 
HMSO, Edinburgh, 1988. 
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TABLES 
The Structure of Revenue Sources in the Scottish HRA 
Proportional Source of Revenue 
Year Average Rents and HSG RFC 
Revenue other payments 
1977178 415 52 36 12 
1978179 465 53 34 13 
1979/80 579 47 39 14 
1980/81 688 50 37 13 
1981/82 729 59 25 16 
1982/83 758 66 16 18 
1983/84 764 71 11 18 
1984/85 810 71 9 20 
1985/86 826 77 9 14 
1987/87(1) 861 83 7 10 
1987/88(2) 892 88 6 6 
(I) Estimated (2) Projected 
Source: COSLA 
TABLE6 
The Growth of Rents and Incomes in Scotland and England 
(1977 = 100) 
Real Average Rent as percent 
Scottish LA Rents Gross Weekly of Average RPI 
Rents Normal Earnings Earnings 
Year Scotland E&W Scotland E&W Scotland E&W 
1977 100 100 100 100 100 6.1 8.3 100 
1978 104 111 106 114 114 5.9 7.7 108 
1979 104 122 116 129 133 5.7 7.3 126 
1980 103 146 147 153 155 5.8 7.9 146 
1981 119 191 205 173 172 6.7 9.9 163 
1982 127 224 242 188 188 7.3 10.7 174 
1983 130 245 252 203 206 7.3 10.2 183 
1984 130 260 264 217 220 7.3 10.0 192 
1985 137 287 280 235 238 7.4 9.8 202 
1986 145 323 294 251 253 7.8 9.7 208 
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required modernization cost for the social sector in Scotland is in the range 
of £7-10 billion) government has increased municipal spending 
permissions. 
This respite may be temporary. Until 1988 SSHA and the Housing 
Corporation have acquired municipal units for modernization on an ad hoc 
basis and only with municipal agreement. These agencies were therefore 
only able to invest limited amounts in previously municipal stock. Urban 
policy proposals for Scotland, which are in the infancy of their 
implementation, envisage much wider transfers of municipal stock to other 
agencies and the private sector. This issue is discussed further below, here 
we note that if 'Scottish Homes' is successful we cannot expect that real 
municipal housing budgets will continue to increase in scale. 
Central government has also, in an important structural shift, de-
municipalized revenue sources in the Housing Revenue Account (see 
Tables 5 and 6). Real rent increases for council stock are indicated in Table 
6. With reduced Housing Support Grant from 1980 onwards, many councils 
matched subsidy cuts with a combination of rent increases and increased 
subventions from the Rate Fund. Since 1984/85 comments on Rate Fund 
spending have reduced the RFC from 20 to 6 percent of current 
expenditure. 
The figures in Table 5 are often used, it should be emphasized 
incorrectly, to suggest that council housing subsidies have fallen sharply 
since 1980. This deduction is nonsense. Housing benefit now pays 60 to 75 
percent of rent increases in Scottish local authorities and, indeed, subsidies 
arising from historic cost accounting procedures have grown in value over 
time. The fact that the rent to income ratio has only risen from 6.1 to 7.8 
percent over the decade would tend to suggest that real net subsidies may 
not have altered significantly. 
Housing Planning in Retreat 
The beginnings of a more pluralistic social housing sector and the 
cutback environment did not greatly stimulate the planning/enabling role 
of all Scottish municipalities. Some authorities were hostile to associations, 
and the Housing Corporation was hardly systematic in the spatial 
development of its programme across Scottish authorities. Indeed by 1988 
an Institute of Housing (IoH) report indicated that only half of Scottish 
authorities felt that they had developed a "working together" approach 
with other social housing investors. In most cases cooperation was 
relatively token in nature. 
A review of Scottish Housing Plans by the Centre for Housing 
Research (CHR) in 1985 also indicated that most were short, bidding 
documents which provided no analysis and little hard information. Aside 
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from a few notable authorities which prepared well argued plans, such as 
Glasgow or Gordon District, municipalities were stupid enough to give the 
government what they asked for. 
As an outside, albeit interested, observer it has never failed to amaze 
me that Scottish housing authorities were never prepared to put a well 
researched, incontrovertible case for their programme to the Scottish 
Office. Instead political statement and a few crude figures have driven the 
reaction against government policies. If it were not for the fact that so many 
poor Scots live in bad council housing, it would be laughable that in 1985 
Scottish local authorities began to argue for a Scottish House Condition 
Survey. Why, if municipalities have been large scale providers since 1890, 
don't authorities keep property records? Why do fewer than 20 percent 
regularly inspect their stock? Why do they not have property record files on 
repair and disrepair? If authorities were good, caring landlords why did 
they not already know the conditions their tenants resided in? 
It is only in a particularly incompetent or self-deluding industry that 25 
years of self-neglect can form the basis of an anti-government campaign. Of 
course we should have a Scottish Housing Survey, though not like EHCS, 
but it should not be imposed from the centre but aggregated up from below. 
Local authorities have to demonstrate an interest in and commitment to 
strategic and resource planning. The 1980's experience of housing planning 
in Scotland suggests that central government would be unwise to adopt the 
view that when municipal management is poor that local authorities should 
retreat to an enabling, strategic rate. These roles require vision, resources 
and a good understanding of management. Poor managers may be even 
worse strategists. We return to this point below. 
The Evolving Context 
Against this background of shrinking policies and perceptions the 
Scottish housing system has continued to evolve. On the positive side, over 
the last decade, more people now live in their preferred tenure, the level of 
dwelling amenity has improved and the vast bulk of Scots are satisfied with 
their generally improving homes. 
The problem of the last decade has not been falling or slowly rising 
averages. Rather it has been increasing dispersion around the means. 
Clearly there is a problem of low income access to rental housing, the 
numbers of homeless have doubled, needs provision estimates for a range 
of client groups greatly outstrip present provision and housing and 
neighbourhood conditions have sharply deteriorated in, say, the bottom 20 
percent of the council stock. In spite of still extensive housing subsidies 
(properly measured) and new targetting measures, it is still the poorest 
households who receive least effective support from the state. This 
outcome, in part, reflects the way in which municipalities allocate, price 
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and manage the scarce housing resources provided to them. Recent 
developments in Community Charge legislation and social security reform 
which have potentially damaging impacts in poor, rundown estates do not 
absolve central government of all responsibility for the difficulties in these 
areas. 
Reverting to housing issues, the next section summarizes the causes of 
the present disorder in many, but not all housing departments. 
PROBLEM EVOLUTION IN COUNCIL HOUSING 
The remaking of areas council housing has become is the key policy 
issue of Scottish housing since 1985, perhaps a decade late. The changing 
context has placed growing demands upon management services. As in 
England, council vacancy rates increased into the early 1980s but have 
more recently declined. Rates of rent arrears have doubled since 1980, with 
the Scottish pattern broadly similar to England outside of London. Repair 
requests, according to 1985 research evidence<1l, had increased by an 
average of one third between 1980 and 1985. At the same time analysis of 
1981 census data indicated that the most deprived small areas in Scotland 
were no longer in older, private neigbhbourhoods (as in 1971) but in council 
estates. 
The critical issue for Scottish council housing is that rising service 
demands and deteriorating conditions are usually concentrated into 
neighbourhoods containing the poorest households. Such locations whilst 
being most evident in the large cities are by no means restricted to them. 
Paisley, Perth and Hawick, for example, have all experienced such 
difficulties. 
As noted in the previous section, critics of government policy have 
argued that council house sales and reduced Housing Support Grant 
(HSG), with consequent rent rises largely created these difficulties. These 
arguments are open to doubt. From 1979 to 1986, the Scottish public sector 
sold around 100,000 units, less than 10 percent of the stock. As most 
purchasers were middle aged households, often in middle-to-better quality 
properties, it is unlikely that these houses would have been relet during the 
1980s as these groups have particularly low mobility rates. Sales receipts 
have been available for reinvestment and by the mid 1990s, when the relet 
effects would have been occurring, shortages of council housing may well 
not exist. Of course in some smaller, usually rural areas, their negative relet 
effects are more obvious at an earlier stage. Sales of council houses have so 
far, had little influence, positive or negative, on the key problems of 
Scottish council housing. 
The difficulties now faced in Scottish council housing, albeit that 
capital expenditure restrictions have limited the extent of their removal, 
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arise from at least three long term processes. First, council housing has 
matured adversely. Not only has there been a failure of municipalities to 
maintain housing stock adequately, and this problem dates from the 1950s 
and not the 1980s, but relatively new, non-traditional stock has 
deteriorated at alarmingly early vintages. The physical environments of 
these areas have matured adversely in the last two decades and 
dissatisfaction with housing conditions is also highly correlated with 
neighbourhood dissatisfaction. As residents had little direct involvement in 
estate design and management, and, of course, have no equity share in 
dwellings, the external public spaces in public schemes have often fallen 
into a cycle of disuse and then misuse. Indeed surveys of tenants usually 
indicate that vandalism, petty crime and inept environmental 
improvements are the three main sources of irritation in their lives. These 
were management issues ignored for too long, and indeed the postwar 
public sector has, for four decades, seemed oblivious to the research 
observation that the demand for higher quality housing and environments 
increase with income. 
The families who entered the public sector in the boom periods 
between 1955 and 1975 have also aged and a disproportionate share of 
those left behind are elderly and single person households. Council housing 
has become primarily a tenure for the elderly. In Glasgow, for instance, 
more than half of tenants are over the age of 60, though in general the 
elderly live in the better council areas. Because of the pricing system, more 
than a third of these households still live in the house to which they were 
first allocated when they entered the council sector. At present there is a 
gross inefficiency in the use of council dwellings with elderly households 
often living in larger, better quality council houses with younger, poorer 
families living in overcrowded conditions in the less populated areas. 
Much of the public policy debate in housing has argued for better, 
appropriate housing for the elderly. Of course high standards for all the 
elderly are laudable. But these standards should not be achieved at the cost 
of families with children, especially the children of single parent families. 
We are in danger, perhaps for the first time in half a century, of offering a 
declining quality of life to children in housing schemes. Infant mortality is 
actually rising in some areas, Scottish fitness standards of children are low 
and falling, more smoke and use drugs than ten years ago and educational 
performance in the most deprived areas is abysmal and reportedly 
deteriorating. Low housing quality and no prospect of a job is the 
expectation not the exception for "Jock Thompson's Bairns" in the 1990s. 
The youngsters of Castlemilk have, now, more in common with those of 
Northeast Philadelphia, Les Minguettes etc. than with those of their 
parents only 20 years ago. And worst of all, the housing schemes are 
becoming self-absorbing systems. In Glasgow's big schemes, 80-90 percent 
of net new lets go to existing scheme residents forming new households. 
Such households are generally unwaged and unmarried. We need a housing 
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policy for the young, just as much as the elderly. 
The second related process is that these areas, whilst the absolute 
levels of real council incomes increased into the 1980s, became relatively 
poorer over time. Aside from the fact that elderly tenants had no stored-up 
housing asset with which to trade down and extract capital as they aged and 
retired, the working age population were particularly susceptible to the 
general increase in unemployment from the early 1970s onwards. Those 
who would argue that a "dependence culture" is a cause rather than a 
consequence of neighbourhood decline, would do well to note that the 
majority of non-elderly adults who are now benefit "dependent" in 
Glasgow were active in the labour force in the 1970s. Taking the 
unemployed and the elderly together only one council household in three in 
the city has an adult in employment. By implication, these social housing 
areas would still be problematic even if the overall unemployment rate in 
Scotland were returned to the low levels of the 1960s. 
The third process operating is what is often referred to as 
residualisation and, in Scotland, it is the least important of the three. As 
areas decline in physical quality and as their residents become relatively 
poorer they become unattractive to households with any degree of choice. 
As a result, the poorest areas attract only young unemployed households, 
jobless single persons and single-parent families in particular. Longer-
established council tenants are offered better council housing, or they can 
wait for the right offer, and younger households with incomes enter the 
owner-occupied sector. In the longer term, sales policies can aggravate this 
problem. 
SHOULD COUNCILS REMAKE RENTAL HOUSING? 
It is now obvious, including to the Scottish Office, that a major 
reinvestment programme is needed. What is less obvious is whether 
councils should be the main reinvestors or whether different forms of 
socially oriented housing landlords, such as associations, co-operatives and 
trusts should have this major responsibility. This judgement must be based 
upon an understanding of whether the management capacity or style of 
councils has improved over the last decade and whether they can operate 
effectively at the localized scale required for the revitalization of housing 
and communities. 
Although there has been no systematic review of the effectiveness of 
housing management in Scotland (as there has been for England and Wales 
between 1985 and 1987) there are some signs that the structure and style of 
management in Scotland is now changing. 
A recent review<2) suggested that around three-fifths of Scottish 
housing Departments have an integrated structure. Smaller, rural councils, 
114 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1989 
as in England, often spread housing functions to different departments and 
may not have a "Director of Housing." The reorganization of local 
government, with housing as the predominant District level function, and 
the 1980s demise in the power of "planning" departments have often placed 
the Housing Department at the centre of Council activities. 
If "integration" has proceeded apace with England, decentralization 
of housing management provision is less marked. Some 40 percent of 
Scottish councils, once again the smaller councils, operate from a single 
main office. Only a fifth could be said to be operating a decentralized form 
of management and even in these authorities the frontline management 
units may be large. For instance, Glasgow regards itself as decentralized, 
but the average office size is greater than the average size of council housing 
Departments in England! Small may be beautiful, but it is also a relative 
term. Allocation, repair provision and rent accounting are the commonly 
decentralized services. 
Almost all decentralized authorities are also extensively 
computerized. In 1975n6 no Scottish authorities used computers for 
management purposes. The recent Scottish survey, by J S Aboud, indicated 
that by 1986 some 80 percent of authorities used computers for rent 
accounting and housing benefit administration, 45 percent of the 
organization of jobbing maintenance but only 20 percent for allocation 
tasks. This latter figure is surprisingly low. However, few Scottish 
Authorities had developed an integrated computing system capable of 
adequately serving local or decentralized offices. 
Regarding the details of the provision of key services, again Scottish 
authorities were broadly similar to patterns in England. In the area of 
allocations policy, points schemes of various kinds were operated in three-
fifths of authorities, in contrast to a much smaller proportion in 1976. A 
further third operated variants of date order schemes and less than 5 
percent used policies with officer or councillor discretion as the key 
consideration. Over the last decade councillors have been removed from 
day to day involvement in housing allocation in Scotland. More recently, 
especially in Glasgow, there has been a growing debate as to whether 
control of allocations policy should be devolved to local area groups 
including tenants. 
Regarding maintenance provision, Stanforth et al indicated that, in 
common with England, less than a quarter of councils have a clear planned 
maintenance strategy for their stock. A variety of approaches to response 
maintenance provision existed. More receipting, better training of staff, 
increased inspection levels and decentralization were all seen as key 
requirements for improving the service. Cost effective providers often had 
large scale usage of Direct Labour Offices (DLOs), as is the case in 
England, but a worrying place-to-place variation in service administration 
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costs was noted. 
Rent collection services in Scotland are more centralized than in 
England. Three quarters of councils rely on rent collection at offices and 
only 10 percent use door to door collection methods. Rent payment periods 
are broadly similar to England with a quarter collected monthly and 40 
percent weekly. 
There has been no attempt to assess the effectiveness of management 
of these policies in Scotland. But existing approaches are not entirely 
consistent with what is widely regarded as good practice. Glasgow is often 
described as a forward-thinking landlord but in that city three quarters of 
tenants are dissatisfied with the repairs service and more than half of 
tenants have expressed an interest in organizing their own repairs. 
Research has also claimed that the council's allocation policy exacerbates 
small area social composition problems. And centralized rent collection is 
generally associated with higher rates of rent arrears. 
Compared with the efforts of the Audit Commission, and Department 
of the Environment (DoE) in England, the Scottish Office have done 
relatively little to review or reinvigorate housing management practice in 
Scotland. An exception to this general statement is in the area of tenant 
participation. The 1980 Tenants' Rights (Scotland) Act extended to tenants 
new rights concerning succession and consultation in relation to tenancy 
agreements. Scottish tenants did not gain, in contrast to England, the 
automatic right to consultation regarding a broad range of housing 
management matters. However, two other aspects of Scottish Office action 
did boost tenant involvement. First, in 1980 the Tenants' Participation 
Advisory Service (TP AS) was set up under the guidance of the Scottish 
Council for Social Services. TP As and related measures appear to have had 
a considerable impact since 1980. In 1980 few authorities had a formal 
participation policy, there were no housing officers with specific 
participation responsibilities in the field and there were around 300 tenants' 
groups and only one Tenants' Federation, in Glasgow. By 1986, 22 of the 56 
landlords had a formal tenant participation policy and only 4 had explicitly 
rejected this management style. The number of tenants' groups has grown 
to more than 1,000 and there are now 16 Tenants' Federations, generally in 
larger authorities. 
The shift toward management styles and structures involving more and 
more tenant action, has also been reflected in Scottish Office advice 
encouraging the formation of tenant management and ownership co-ops. 
And, in Scotland, much of the current repute of the housing association 
movement has been earned through their participative approach. 
In Scotland, in 1988, no one now doubts that remaking social housing 
areas and in the process involving tenants is the key priority of Scottish 
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housing policy. 
Desiderata in the New Order 
There seems to be a number of key desiderata, on the part of central 
government, regarding the agents to undertake such change. First, does the 
organization provide levels and qualities of service which are consistent 
with customers preferences? Secondly, does the consumer have the facility 
to be consulted or involved in management as well as invest in management 
decisions? Thirdly, are the service bureaucrats locally accessible and 
involved? Fourthly, is the organization committed to keeping costs under 
control, consistent with good service delivery, and in order to do so, is it 
prepared to contract out services? Fifthly, is the organization amenable to 
facilitating the shift of units and households to owned tenures? Sixthly, is 
there a commitment to economize on public finance? Finally, will rents 
reflect dwelling quality, insofar as this is consistent with client group 
affordability? 
Some councils, in at least some of their stock, may already be 
implementing such desiderata, but many will not be. Even more would 
resist such changes, and in these cases municipalities cannot probably 
expect direct government support. The real question is whether or not 
housing associations in Scotland can, with stock transferred to them, accept 
an expanded role. 
Recent research in England suggests both large regional associations 
(of which there are no equivalents in Scotland, except perhaps SSHA) and 
small associations provide quality services, involve tenants and are locally 
accessible. And some have stimulated low cost home ownership and equity 
sharing schemes. However many small associations are high cost, many 
larger ones fail to capture economies of scale and the use of private finance 
is only now growing. As in England, the average association spends almost 
twice as much as councils on management. Associations are better service 
providers, but at a higher cost. The design of legislation to transfer 
management does, in theory, leave this choice open to tenants. 
Government has been correct not to back a single tenure or organizational 
form for remaking Scottish housing. There is little expectation that 
proposed changes will produce any long term result other than the de-
municipilization of social housing. There is evidence from Canada, 
Sweden, France and the Netherlands to suggest that good social housing is a 
function of good design, realistic pricing, targetted subsidies and good 
management and not on specific municipal forms of provision. Our recent 
experience of municipal housing in some parts of Scotland is enough to 
suggest at least a partial de-municipilization of social housing. 
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MUNICIPALITIES AND THE HOUSING BILL 
There is little doubt that the 1988 Housing Bill contains measures 
which could fundamentally change rental housing provision in Britain and 
in favourable ways. Whether or not it will do so depends upon the way in 
which Ministers select the specific measures and provisions, for instance the 
HAG rate, to achieve the broad objectives of the Bill. For unlike many 
legislative statements forming British housing policy, the 1988 Bill was long 
on important ideas and principles and very short on particular measures. 
Equally, in relation to 'Scottish Homes', as the location, staffing, 
budget and style of this organization are yet to be determined, it would be 
unhelpful to speculate on the details of its future operation. However this 
section sets out key tasks which, as well as existing SSHA stock and 
association activity, will confront 'Scottish Homes' into the 1990s. The 1988 
legislation discussed in this paper should be regarded as an experiment, 
with the terms and location of the trial as yet to be determined. In broad 
terms, the experiment is concerned to increase the scale of private 
investment in rental housing (private and social tenures alike) and to 
upgrade the housing and neighbourhood qualities of rental areas. Although 
the renewed interest in rental housing, which dominated discussion of the 
Bill, is to be welcomed, it is important to bear in mind that government still 
regards further expansion in home-ownership as its key housing objective, 
especially in Scotland. 
New Private Renting? 
The private housing sector is both now small ( 6 percent of households) 
and still declining in scale, even if the furnished letting sector in Scottish 
cities appears to have stabilized in scale in the 1980s. Critics with a free 
market orientation are right in identifying rent controls as a deterrent to 
new investment and, therefore, as contributing to the decline in scale and 
quality of the sector. However they would be wrong to suggest that controls 
were the sole or main source of decline since the 1960s and that their 
removal will provoke a sudden burgeoning of market rented housing. For 
most British households long-term housing solutions are provided by the 
owner occupied sector, reflecting taxation arrangements, financing systems 
etc., or the social rented sector, usually where income levels preclude 
access to owner occupation.<Jl Government does not wish to prioritize 
renting tenures ahead of owner occupation (given its wider "property 
owning democracy" ethos) and it is not at all clear that, even if there were to 
be more generous Housing Benefit levels, private lets are a desirable 
solution for low-income "family" housing. 
There is, however, a case for liberalizing private rental housing in 
order that it might play its "specialized" housing tenure role more 
effectively. The 1988 Act adopts this argument for deregulating rents on 
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new lettings and moving away from the Fair Rent regime. New lets will 
have rents agreed between tenant and landlord and security of tenure will 
be either on a shorthold or assured tenancy basis. The key advantage of 
private rental housing is that it has low entry and transaction costs for 
residents. The tenure is potentially useful for those who know that they will 
shortly be moving again or those who are uncertain about future housing 
requirements. Mobile households of all ages, couples living together prior 
to selecting a longer term residence, temporarily relocated employees, etc. 
all constitute potential markets. Demand is further diversified by 
households with relatively limited short term access to capital, such as 
young singles setting up home for the first time or the recently separated or 
divorced. 
Much of this demand is presently met by the furnished rental sector 
and although as many as two-thirds of such lets are already made outside 
the Rent Acts, there are obvious signs of shortage of such accommodation, 
particularly for good quality apartments. These patterns suggest, in the 
foreseeable future, that deregulation will neither greatly increase rental 
supply nor will there be a significant increase in rents vis-a-vis housing 
prices in general. The new landlords such as Quality Street and the Business 
Expansion schemes, initiated by solicitors in Glasgow, are likely to find a 
profitable but unlimited niche in providing central city, quality lets for 
young mobiles and singles. 
Calls for a more generous tax regime for rental housing to extend the 
middle income rental market are unlikely to receive Treasury support. The 
eligibility of private rental schemes for Business Expansion Schemes, tax 
concessions announced in the 1988 Budget, are likely to mark the full 
extent of such concessions. A general tax break for landlords would largely 
mean competition with tax-subsidized owner occupiers. Wasted tax 
expenditures and higher land and housing prices, especially in the more 
pressured and popular area where such schemes appear to be most widely 
advocated, are the likely outcome. Such effects would be less pronounced if 
landlords received tax subsidies to upgrade existing properties or convert 
derelict or commercial properties into homes. 
Looking further to the future, demographic patterns are not now 
greatly conducive to a marked increase in the stock demand for private 
rentai housing. The unfurnished relict will literally die off. A more 
promising market for private landlords may be to induce the growing 
elderly population, and particularly the post 75s to release capital by selling 
to responsible landlords and leasing back. Such a market would be 
curtailed, of course, by any major growth in maturity lending. None of 
these changes in private rental provision seriously threatens the role of 
municipalities. 
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Transfers and Municipal Housing 
Although a large scale expansion of private renting seems unlikely 
there is some prospect of expansion in direct private investment in stock 
transferring away from local authority ownership and thus facilitating de-
municipalization. The legislative proposals of early 1988, whilst in no way 
discouraging individual right-to-buy sales, contained the radical proposal 
that council tenants should be allowed to select an alternative landlord. 
Stock transfer proposals came to be regarded in a number of different ways. 
Many critics saw the measure as being driven by central government's 
continuing pressure to curtail the role of local government. And many 
argued that 'privatization' was the key theme. There is no doubt that 
transfers could reduce municipal roles in the housing field and tilt the 
balance of ownership and provision tilt from public to private sectors. 
There is another possible interpretation, namely, that the government 
attack is aimed at monopolies rather than council status per se. Council 
monopoly provision in the low income sector could produce low quality 
services. Naturally, some right wing commentators believe this to be true of 
all councils. Interestingly, major speeches by Mr Rifkind (Secretary of 
State for Scotland) have made it clear that efficient councils, meeting their 
tenants' aspirations, would be little influenced by transfer activity. 
Certainly, from the housing analysis standpoint it is difficult to see how 
competition or potential competition in social rental housing provision, if 
adequately supervised, could have an adverse effect on tenants. In due 
course it could also be argued that tenants should be able to transfer to 
councils and away from other social landlords if tenants prefer such 
solutions. The pick-a-landlord proposal is then, potentially, a rapid route to 
a more pluralistic social rental sector. There is no inevitable connection 
between good social housing and municipal ownership and provision. Nor 
indeed are social housing slums the preserve of municipalities, and 
government should note this for the future- changes in ownership will not 
solve all of the key issues in rundown estates. 
If there is a case for the general principle of pick-a-landlord, it is still 
possible to be less than convinced that the proposed implementation 
strategy is adequate. In England, during 1988, more than 100 local 
authorities, many of them rural authorities or authorities with a council 
stock of less than 5,000 units, approached DoE, the IoH and potential 
alternative landlords to discuss the possibility of transferring stock. 
Voluntary municipal interest of this kind appears to have been on a much 
smaller scale in Scotland, with no more than four or five authorities making 
such plans. 
As yet there have been few approaches originating from tenants 
groups in either Scotland or England. The Housing Corporation are to be 
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charged with promoting and approving alternative landlords in England. 
'Scottish Homes' and 'Homes for Wales', the new quangos constructed 
from existing organizations to promote new rental sector policies, will have 
these responsibilities in Scotland and Wales. 
If pick-a-landlord is to operate pervasively in Scotland, 'Scottish 
Homes' will have to counter quickly the active and vigorous campaigns of 
opponents, who are out in the estates on a day-by-day basis, and which are 
sometimes fuelled by fear rather than fact. Recent research shows that less 
than 1 percent of council tenants know what a housing association is, that 
less than 10 percent of tenants will undertake participation to change their 
areas and that pick-a-landlord is perceived as 'a return to the private 
landlord'. Many older tenants in council housing suffered costly indignities 
at the hands of private landlords for decades. They will stick to the 'devil 
they know' unless the alternatives are promoted locally and clearly and 
continuously. How will 'Scottish Homes' do this? Will it create incentives 
for associations to promote transfers or create co-ops from municipal 
housing? H associations follow this route, will the smaller, high-cost 
associations adapt their management systems to cope with change, will they 
lose their caring reputation if they grow markedly in scale? Financial 
inhibitions to transfer are considered further below. 
Transfer votes for a potentially transferring area, are to be organized 
independently but paid for by the new potential landlord. A majority of 
tenants have to vote against the transfer proposal for it to fall. That is 
abstensions/non-votes count as 'yes' votes. Government may have been 
better to stick to basic democratic principles on this issue and to have 
devised a more intensive promotion strategy. 
Obviously tenants will not transfer solely on the issue of service quality 
of municipaVanti-municipal ideology. They will be concerned with tenants' 
rights, their security of tenure, rents and future rents, opportunities for 
involvement and prospects for modernization. The Government, after 
much internal discussion, came to the view that tenants in transfer schemes 
would not have a 'Social Housing Tenancy' but rather rely upon selecting 
the contractual terms of assured tenancies. This decision, may demonstrate 
a lack of understanding of how many tenants perceive such issues - if they 
have a complaint or grievance they will generally prefer to visit their 
councillor or area housing manager rather than have recourse to lawyers 
and contract enforcement. Such a view pays scant regard to the income and 
indeed educational levels which now prevail in many of our worst housing 
estates. In the absence of Social Housing tenancies, securing customer 
confidence may take a long time and much patience on either side. 
The prices at which estates transfer will be critical in determining the 
attractiveness oftransfer. Currently it is proposed that 'tenanted' values are 
set but clearly this is an area for much dispute where councils are hostile to 
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transfers. Naturally, central government can encourage stock transfer 
through finance and subsidy systems. As long as central government 
controls overall housing capital spending, it may shift potential 
modernization resources from councils to other investors through 'Scottish 
Homes'. However, major changes in capital grants to housing associations 
(see below), could compromise the potential rate of transfers. In autumn 
1988 the Government produced its consultation documents for housing 
revenue accounts and capital spending. These papers suggest quite major 
changes which could increase council rents and discourage rent pooling, all 
of which facilitate transfer policies. 
There is now a potential for a major reorganization of social housing in 
Britain. Poor promotion and conflicting financial decisions could 
compromise such changes. And where changes do take place, care will have 
to be taken that competition continues and we do not see the formation of 
new, local and non-municipal monopolies. In general growing pluralism 
will not mean extensive privatization. Private landlords such as 'Quality 
Street', are not likely to have access to higher modernization subsidies than 
associations and co-operatives (in my view they should have equal subsidy 
rights if competition is to be tenure-neutral) and they do have a 
requirement to make a surplus. Unless private landlords are going to be 
more efficient than social landlords by a considerable margin they will not 
be able to compete extensively. 
Housing Association Finance 
Housing associations, in spite of their past and likely future 
dependence of public subventions, are now to form an "Independent 
Rented Sector" along with Private Rental Housing. This grouping makes 
no real sense, but let us leave aside the labels and examine the substance of 
the movement. There are more than 180 associations in Scotland, providing 
homes for more than 50,000 households. Aside from a few large national 
associations they have been accustomed to operating on a small, often local 
scale, building houses and rehabilitating homes with the support of 
communities and municipalities. Most have little experience, in recent 
years, of fast growth and of coping with local political hostility. 
Housing associations, as a number of recent studies have shown, do 
not now constitute a "privileged" sector of social housing provision. Their 
resident populations are as poor as council tenants, unemployment rates 
are similar and age structures are not dissimilar. As associations mature, 
some of them are also showing some signs of inadequate maintenance, 
serious mismatches of stock size and household type and symptoms of 
wider neighbourhood deterioration. Set beside this, however, the majority 
of associations have achieved impressive levels of customer satisfaction. 
Rent levels approximate those of authorities, although capital grants 
(HAG) have commonly financed 80 percent (and more) of development 
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work. As indicated above, associations, apart from lower cost regionals/ 
nationals, are good but expensive managers. It is not surprising that 
government has often chided councils to aspire to the service performance 
levels of associations (at least on most management indicators). But 
government advocacy of the virtues of associations has peaked, just as a 
new financial regime for associations is being devised. Government 
discussions of associations, throughout 1987 and 1988, stressed that neither 
capital grants (HAG) nor current subsidies (RDG) and external rent 
setting encouraged efficient resource use. In general the marginal 
additional costs of capital projects fell upon HAG expenditures rather than 
rents or association surpluses. External rent-setting and the clawback of 
surplus revenues (Grant Redemption Fund) meant that associations had 
minimal incentives to economize on current spending until allowance levels 
were reached.<4>,(5> 
If government were correct in the identification of these problems 
there are fewer grounds for being convinced by the proposed solutions, 
particularly in relation to capital grants. Private finance, whether raised by 
individual associations (expensively) or the Housing Finance Corporation 
(less expensively through economies of scale and expertise), can only be 
raised where investors are satisfied by investment returns and risk 
prospects. The value of existing housing as an asset base against which to 
secure further borrowing is a concept which has gained a fresh currency 
since 1987, and major finance institutions are showing a renewed interest in 
funding housing in the rental sector. Even if the security of the asset base 
reduces risk, rates of return still have to be earned. Early "mixed funding" 
schemes in England were financially viable through a number of ad hoc 
financial adjustments. Land and property was made available to 
associations at below market values, some subsidized new investment from 
existing surpluses and assured tenancies allowed rent levels above "Fair 
Rent" levels. Clearly such ad hoc arrangements could not underpin a major 
expansion in private financing. 
To secure more widespread use of private finance, government has 
proposed that HAG levels be reduced and rents increased. Scottish housing 
associations are now expected to have an average HAG level of75 percent, 
some 10 percent below those of 1987. Where schemes contain at least a 50 
percent share of private money the government will class this proportion of 
investment as "private"; if the private share is less, the whole project will be 
regarded as public (as the public sector will be regarded as bearing the 
investment risk). Associations could choose to build upmarket schemes 
with low HAG rates, say in rehabilitation activity competing with grant 
aided private landlords (whose investment is all regarded as "private" even 
with 50 to 75 percent improvement grants)! These could then be "mixed" 
with schemes for more traditional client groups. Naturally if HAG is 
reduced rents will rise, even if major economies in management and 
maintenance could be secured, and the proposed HAG reductions are 
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likely to increase rents by 50-100 percent on new projects. 
At this juncture the exercise becomes frustrating for central 
government. A series of surveys, albeit that none of them recorded income 
levels in the exhaustive but expensive fashion of government surveys, has 
revealed that almost two-thirds of association tenants in Scotland and 
England alike receive Housing Benefit and for those in employment wages 
are sufficiently low that more than half of tenants in employment would 
have rent to income ratios in excess of 30 percent in the new financing 
regime. It might have, in retrospect, been easier to stretch association 
finance if a revised (correct) conception of "public" spending had been 
adopted by the Treasury and some of Hill's suggestions on index linked 
financing has been adopted. As a result of these proposed changes, 
government now faces some very difficult choices. If HAG rates are 
reduced with no change in Housing Benefit arrangements associations and 
their tenants will face considerable difficulties. And if these difficulties are 
severe, there is little prospect that associations can become the new 
landlords for disintegrating council empires. If that is the case the bold 
conception of the 1988 Bill will not give birth to a new order for social 
housing in Scotland. 
CONCLUSION 
During the next decade we are likely to see a marked reduction in the 
role of municipalities in the Scottish housing system. Home-ownership 
growth will continue, transferring households from municipal to private 
sectors. Investment in social rental housing will be aimed at upgrading the 
quality of the sectors rather than expanding its role. To the extent that 
modernization capital is channeled via non-municipal agencies and that 
council tenants pick alternative landlords, then the municipal role will 
diminish. 
The pattern of response will differ from area to area but the 
management systems and financial structures of council housing will have 
to be altered markedly if councils are to compete. Local authorities will 
have to upgrade their performance as housing planners if they are to be 
regarded as the key strategic housing planners. 
Professor Duncan Maclennan, Centre for Housing Research, Glasgow 
University. 
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